Foresight Arena: A Decentralized On-Chain Benchmark for Evaluating AI Forecasting Agents
Maksym Nechepurenko · 2026 · Working Paper
← Research
Mechanism design
We study how prediction market rules — resolution typology, oracle design, and trading constraints — affect price accuracy, manipulation resistance, and the quality of the information aggregated.
What we ask
- —How does resolution mechanism type affect the calibration of final market prices?
- —What oracle designs minimize the risk of resolution manipulation on contentious markets?
- —Can market structure modifications reduce the profitability of informed trading without harming price discovery?
- —How do trading fee structures interact with market maker behavior and liquidity provision?
How we approach it
- —Resolution typology classification of large-scale Polymarket data
- —Game-theoretic analysis of oracle manipulation incentives
- —Empirical calibration analysis by resolution mechanism category
- —Simulation of alternative fee and access-control regimes
A prediction market is only as good as its rules. The resolution mechanism determines whether prices reflect genuine beliefs or strategic manipulation. The oracle design determines who can influence outcomes and at what cost. The fee structure determines who participates.
These are mechanism design questions with real stakes: misconfigured markets have cost participants money and eroded trust in the whole asset class. Getting the mechanism right is not merely academic.
Publications in this track
Preprint
Datasets
FFIC — ForesightFlow Insider Cases
A curated validation set mapping eight publicly documented episodes of suspected informed trading on Polymarket to concrete on-chain market identifiers. Cases span 2023–2026 and cover 24 individual markets across military and geopolitical actions, corporate proprietary disclosures, and regulatory decisions.